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Abstract: For decades, distribution has been a key ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) area for airlines and this sector has been dominated by four (now three) 
Global Distribution Systems (GDSs) whose primacy has been threatened over the last four 
years by a set of new players, the so called GDS New Entrants (GNEs).  GNEs emerged 
with the advent of the Internet and open source technology as ‘disintermediation’ 
facilitators and generated vast interest from airlines because they promised to reduce the 
cost of distribution.   
This paper explores the impact of ICTs on airlines with a focus on GDSs. It provides an 
overview of the changing market dynamics, analyses the environment that led to the 
appearance of GNEs and pinpoints the issues behind their until now failure to provide a 
true alternative to the GDSs.  This analysis complements existing academic research in that 
it clarifies critical issues in the air travel distribution field and provides an overview of 
current industry developments 
Keywords: travel reservation systems; GDSs; airline industry; information and 
communication technologies 
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1 Introduction 
Internet technology and web based commerce have dramatically transformed the 
airline industry in the last ten years (Werthner and Klein, 2005).  Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs) have always played a predominant role in the 
airline sector (Poon, 1993; Inkpen, 1994; O’Connor, 1999; Werthner and Klein, 
1999) but with the advent of the Internet and open source technology their impact 
is becoming increasingly more crucial and evident (Buhalis, 2004; Jacobsen et al., 
2008). As travellers embraced the Internet, this enabled airlines to bypass the 
traditional distribution pattern through travel agencies and sell direct to end 
consumers (European Commission, 2006). Web distribution combined with cheaper 
and more flexible technologies allowed new players on the market, low cost airlines 
(LCCs), to implement effective low-cost direct distribution strategies and intensify 
competition in the sector (Dennis 2007; Buhalis & Law, 2008). Traditional airlines 
could not afford to rely on outdated distribution strategies and had to invest 
heavily in new technology to support their online Web sites, as post-September 11 
harsh economic conditions and low-fare carriers transformed the marketplace and 
the needs and preferences of passengers changed (Franke, 2004; Binggeli & 
Pompeo, 2005; Dobruszke, 2006)  
Distribution has been a key ICT area for airlines for decades and this sector is now 
dominated by three Global Distribution Systems (GDSs) whose primacy has been 
threatened over the last three years by a set of new players, the so called GDS 
New Entrants (GNEs). 
This paper explores the interaction between technology and airline dstribution with 
a focus on GDSs. It provides a comprehensive review of the changing market 
dynamics, analyses the environment that led to the appearance of the GNEs, and 
assesses the issues behind their until now failure to provide a true alternative to 
GDSs. Finally, the paper draws conclusions from extensive research in industry 
data sources as well as from academic literature and interviews with industry 
experts. The extraordinarily dynamic nature of airline distribution makes any 
conjectures about future developments in the sector sound like crystal-ball 
predictions but experts seem to agree on a number of trends that are here to stay.   
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2 The role of ICTs in the airline industry 
2.1 ICTs as strategic tools 
Information technology is heavily embedded in all levels of airline operations.  
Recently, the term has been broadened to explicitly encompass the electronic 
communication field, and the abbreviation ICT (Information and Communication 
Technology) is now widely used (Buhalis 2004; Gholami, Emrouznejad & Schmidt, 
2008).  Information and Communication technologies may be defined as "electronic 
means of capturing, processing, storing, and disseminating information" (Laudon & 
Laudon, 2007) and provide new mechanisms for handling existing resources and 
information. 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) can provide powerful strategic 
and tactical tools for organizations, which, if properly applied and used, could bring 
great advantages in promoting and strengthening their competitiveness (Porter 
2001, 1985).  Few other industries rely on so many partners to collaborate closely 
for delivering their products and few other value chains are as elaborate as the one 
for travel (Buhalis, 1998). All airlines rely heavily on ICTs for their operations and 
management and employ them for a wide range of business functions.  As a result, 
ICTs can impact airline costs and operational efficiency and there is evidence that 
well managed ICTs can generate tremendous value for organisations (Lee, 2001). 
2.2 Areas of ICT usage in the airline industry 
The portfolio of solutions for airline planning and control ranges from network 
planning, code share handling and crew management, to pricing, price distribution 
and revenue management. Airline ICTs are further supplemented by business 
intelligence services, marketing and sales solutions. Figure 1 summarises the areas 
of ICT usage by airlines. 
We can identify two main groups of airline business functions supported by ICTs.  
The first includes an airline's flight operational activities and the second its 
business management and control functions.  As far as operations are concerned, 
ICTs contribute to the optimisation of flight related procedures and processes.  
Airline operations supported by ICTs include dispatch and coordination of flights 
and related resources namely crew, aircraft, passenger and freight processing, and 
airport facilities such as gates, ramps, baggage handling etc. From a business 
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management and control point of view, airlines employ ICTs in most functions, 
from administrative tasks and accounting to financial management, human 
resources and procurement (Verville, 2003).   
 
Figure 1. “Areas of ICT usage by airlines”. Source: authors 
Airlines use technology to develop and manage their business model as well as to 
monitor the external environment and competition, undertake revenue analysis, 
forecasting, maintain historical data, predict demand, and design desirable 
products. ICTs are critical for monitoring and forecasting the performance of 
Strategic Business Units (SBUs) and for deciding which markets airlines should 
penetrate and how. Routes and crew planning, frequency of service, choice of 
aircraft and developing relationships with strategic partners are key functions 
supported by ICTs (Buhalis, 1998). Strategic pricing and yield management are 
supported by running complex algorithms to establish best performance and 
profitability levels and optimisation and simulation tools are used heavily to 
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maximise revenue in both network planning and revenue management processes 
(Mooney, 2003). 
One of the most critical areas of ICTs' contribution in the airline industry has been 
distribution and collaboration with partners (Buhalis, 2004; Copeland, 1991; 
Copeland & McKenney, 1988).  Industry experts agree that the most significant 
recent technology factor affecting an airline's business has been the Internet which 
has shifted the playing field and undermined many of the schedule and pricing 
assumptions of the traditional airline industry as will be explained in section 4 of 
this paper.   
3 Airline distribution through GDSs 
Airline distribution has for many years been synonymous to Central Reservation 
Systems (CRSs), later termed Global Distribution Systems (GDSs). GDSs have 
served as the nexus of electronic commerce in travel for decades, providing virtual 
real-time connectivity between thousands of suppliers of travel inventory (airlines, 
hotels, car rental, tour operators, cruise lines, etc.) and hundreds of thousands of 
retail sellers of travel products. 
GDSs progressively consolidated their position to only four major systems, namely 
Sabre, Amadeus, Galileo and Wordspan (the two latter now both acquired by 
Travelport, Inc.). This was due to their dominant position as the largest existing 
repositories of travel inventory information (available airline seats, hotel rooms 
etc.) with backing from the travel suppliers that had created and funded them 
(Buhalis & Licata, 2002).  The GDS sector oligopoly was further strengthened by 
the fact that impressive upfront investment in technology infrastructure was 
required to run a GDS, effectively raising important entry barriers to new entrants 
(the Amadeus mainframe centre in Erding, Germany, was said to have the second 
biggest database after NASA).   
GDS platforms evolved from the original airline central reservation systems (CRSs), 
which were first introduced decades ago. Up to the 1970s, travel agencies had to 
locate the best routes and fares for their customers in airline manuals and then call 
the carrier for availability and reservation. The emergence of CRSs not only 
provided a reservation tool and real-time connectivity to travel agencies but, more 
importantly, CRSs were effectively transformed into marketing and distribution 
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systems which contributed significantly to promoting competition between 
vendor/host airlines (Boberg & Collison, 1985; Collier, 1989; Truit, Teye & Farris, 
1991). Each GDS provided airlines with a network of more than fifty thousand 
selling points worldwide and the ability to customise their offers and prices to meet 
market conditions. Currently, the three major GDSs combined, handle over 1.4 
million travel transactions a year.  
After decades of leadership as the carriers' favourite distribution option, GDS firms 
are now facing a number of changes that threaten their margins and business.  
These changes (described in section 4 below) are radically transforming the 
dynamics of airline distribution and the rules of the distribution game. 
4 Latest issues in airline distribution 
4.1 The shift towards online sales, direct distribution and LCCs 
The emergence of the Internet in the mid-1990s forced airlines to reshape their 
distribution strategy in order to boost their competitiveness (Buhalis, 2004).  At 
the same time, a number of no-frills airlines emerged in both Europe and the US.  
Both incumbent and Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) identified the Internet as a major 
opportunity to tackle distribution costs and to reengineer the structure of the 
industry (Calder, 2003; Binggeli & Pompe, 2005).  
LCCs were the first to invest heavily in channelling direct sales through their online 
sales platforms. These airlines developed simple distribution strategies and took 
full advantage of the Internet bypassing travel agents and GDSs (Oorni & Klein, 
2003). They offered incentives for consumers to book online, in a way forcing their 
clients online (Chu, 2001). Consumers rapidly identified the Internet and airline 
Web sites as the platform to benefit from lower prices. In their effort to compete, 
scheduled carriers, traditionally reliant upon GDS platforms, were forced to follow 
suit and develop their online presence (Mason, 2001). 
Major network airlines are determined to get on a comparable footing with the low-
cost carriers (at least for the distribution of their leisure fares) and they are doing 
so by investing heavily in their direct Web business and reducing their GDS 
distribution costs. The industry experts consulted by the authors agreed that 
competition has turned fierce resulting in open price wars.  As traditional airlines 
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extend their offer of low price tickets, their revenue margins shrink accordingly, 
and lowering GDS distribution costs becomes an imperative. 
The Internet also brought about the appearance of online travel agencies on the 
marketplace such as Travelocity and Expedia. Online travel agencies, consumer 
success and high ambitions made airlines react by setting up Orbitz, an online Web 
site with direct connect technology to airlines, bypassing GDSs and their booking 
fees. This entity became a powerful competitor to online travel agencies, and it 
enabled carriers to connect directly via its technology and avoid GDS booking fees. 
But according to many airline industry analysts, Orbitz also had some unintended 
consequences: it helped accelerate the commoditisation of online air distribution 
and put further downward pressure on prices. In short, the airlines successfully 
addressed one problem (cost of distribution) but fuelled another problem (lower 
prices), which in turn generated more pressure to lower the cost of distribution. 
Most industry experts interviewed by the authors agreed that with these online 
sales and direct distribution developments, GDSs have found themselves facing the 
threat of ‘disintermediation’ and ‘commoditisation’. As airlines go direct, GDSs 
seem no longer necessary or at the very least, with the appearance of online 
alternatives to GDSs, their product seems to become a commodity that does not 
justify a high booking fee.  Our review of air distribution industry literature showed 
that the GDSs have reacted against the threats posed by the shift to online direct 
bookings in three ways: first they developed internet based technology, providing 
the transactional infrastructure for Internet travel portals. Secondly, they 
reinvented themselves as main technology suppliers for airlines, extending their 
technology offer to a wider range of ICTs and technology consultancy services. 
Finally, GDSs have tried to pre-empt the airlines' Web sites by establishing their 
own online travel agency Web sites, such as Travelocity (owned by Sabre) or 
Opodo (owned by Amadeus). 
Despite GDS and travel agency efforts to protect an intermediary based distribution 
model, carriers' direct share of online air ticket sales in the US reached 61% of the 
online market versus 39% for Online Travel Agencies (OTAs) (PhoCusWright, 
2008). According to the same source this balance is projected to hold steady 
through 2010, although intense competition and tumultuous dynamics underlie this 
equilibrium. The airlines corporate web sites have been enjoying considerable 
growth year over year, and their marketing initiatives are driving customer loyalty 
 doi:10.3926/jiem.2009.v2n1.p251-272  ©© JIEM, 2009 – 2(1): 251-272 – ISSN: 2013-0953 
 
Progress in airline distribution systems: The threat of new entrants to incumbent players 258 
A. Sismanidou; M. Palacios; J. Tafur 
and a powerful shift in consumer behaviour. The experts asked by the authors 
agreed that this level of activity on the part of airlines will continue in an effort to 
shift more and more share from the online agencies to their corporate web sites.   
These developments mean that the traditional GDS model, based purely on travel 
agency distribution, has been eroded by the shift to airline direct online sales.  The 
increase in airlines' negotiating power became apparent in the latest rounds of 
GDS-airline contracting that essentially focused on the cost of distribution for 
discounted leisure fares where it is said that airlines have achieved discounts of up 
to 40% in their booking fees (Quinby, 2006). The leisure travel segment is the one 
where airlines have the most leverage, yet these are the products which have the 
highest relative cost of distribution.   
Most experts consulted agreed that those suffering the most from the shift to 
online direct sales are traditional travel agencies and that they do not expect all 
travel agencies to survive this era.  The new airlines-endorsed GDS programmes 
for agencies impose steep cuts in incentive payments and allow for charges to be 
paid to the airline in case of selling low-value tickets (see Figure 2 below for the 
new paradigm in the airline-GDS-travel agency relationship).  
 
Cashflows in old GDS
distribution paradigm
Airline
GDS
Travel Agency
GDS incentive
same booking fee
commissions
overrides
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Figure 2. “Changing GDS model”. Source: authors 
The shift is more obvious in the US (facilitated by GDS deregulation in 2004) but is 
also the trend in Europe. Lufthansa and its Swiss subsidiary initiated in 2008 in 
Germany, Austria and Switzerland a €4.90 per-way surcharge plus value-added tax 
on fares booked through the Amadeus GDS.  As a result Amadeus is losing 
significant market share in Germany (10% loss in two months, Air and Business 
Travel News, 2009). 
4.2 Growth and risks in air travel demand 
At the level of air travel, demand is growing worldwide as a result of economic 
development, globalisation, international trade, cheaper passenger fares and 
improved airline services. World airlines have experienced average traffic growth of 
around 5% per year in the last 10 years and industry analysts (Boeing Current 
Market Outlook, 2008) project that world air traffic demand will grow in the next 
20 years at an annual rate of 5%. 
Despite such phenomenal growth projections, industry analysts maintain that air 
travel demand is subject to a series risks such as economic downturns, 
unpredictable geopolitical events, rising fuel costs and environmental concerns. 
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Uncertainty in all these areas makes airlines vulnerable to the future and presses 
them to streamline costs (including distribution) as much as possible in order to 
shield themselves against potential falls in demand and/or revenue margins. 
4.3 GDS deregulation 
The US and Europe regulated the GDS sector in the 1980s. These regulations were 
introduced at a time when GDSs were owned by airlines and there was a visible 
threat that GDSs would give preferential treatment to their owners (for example a 
biased display of the airline's flights on the travel agent's screen) and jeopardise 
fair competition. 
As airlines divested their stakes in their GDSs and the Internet widened up the 
distribution and buying choices for airlines and end consumers respectively, 
regulators felt that it was no longer necessary to protect the market. In 2004, 
GDSs were deregulated in the US and the European Commission is currently 
examining whether to partially revise or fully abolish its Code of Conduct for CRSs 
(in Europe, Amadeus is still partly owned by Iberia, Air France and Lufthansa and 
hence the discussion on a partial instead of full deregulation). 
Deregulation led to a new state of affairs where airlines are no longer obliged to 
participate equally in all GDSs and can steer business to selected GDSs. Biased 
seat availability displays are no longer prohibited and airlines can freely negotiate 
booking fees and level of participation in each GDS. 
As a result of GDS deregulation in the US and the prospect of an amended 
deregulation in Europe, GDSs are changing their business model, allowing for more 
flexibility in their pricing (Alamdari & Mason, 2006). But, according to the same 
authors, what deregulation effectively means is additional pressure on GDS 
margins with 60% of airlines seeing deregulation as an opportunity to gain greater 
control over their distribution channels and to establish their relationship with GDS 
companies on a “value for money” basis.   
4.4 Technological advances 
As mentioned earlier in section 3, an important entry barrier to the GDS business 
has been the GDS model's reliance on a formidable technological platform. GDSs 
based their system architectures on mainframe computing platforms running TPF, 
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IBM's durable Transaction Processing Facility OSS. These platforms served GDSs 
and airlines well for decades because of their ability to handle huge transaction 
volumes (up to ten thousands per second) with superb reliability and response 
times. They deliver secure systems with a 99.9% assurance of connectivity, 
response times of a fraction of a second and allow them to offer highly accurate 
and comprehensive fares and pricing systems worldwide and process billions of 
travel transactions monthly. 
With the Internet explosion, GDSs with their legacy mainframes were described as 
dinosaurs. The GDS applications designed decades ago have been repeatedly 
amended to accommodate new functionality, each time adding complexity and 
cost. But since the emergence of more flexible Internet-based technologies in the 
1990s, flexibility and open architecture have become key requirements in the 
market (Quinby, 2005). New technology not only makes it easier to write 
applications in modern programming languages with an emphasis on adaptability 
and ease of integration with other systems, it also allows such applications to be 
run on PC-class servers running Linux OS, offering a major up-front cost advantage 
over IBM mainframes in terms of hardware and software licenses. 
Based on our primary and secondary research, we can conclude that such 
technological breakthroughs have had a dual impact on GDSs. On the one hand 
they have lowered the entry barriers and opened a window of opportunity for new 
entrants in the sector and on the other hand they constitute a big expense item to 
GDSs who, in order not to become obsolete, are obliged to migrate their legacy 
systems to open system architecture. All GDSs are currently engaged in costly 
exercises of moving towards an open system architecture (our industry sources 
suggested that Amadeus have invested more than one billion euros in the 
migration project). 
5 GDS New Entrants (GNEs) 
This changing environment with its hassles for the GDS industry gave rise in 2005 
to a number of companies – including Triton Distribution Systems, ITA Software, 
G2 Switchworks and Farelogix– which all claimed that they were developing GDS 
alternatives. In an environment where airlines were complaining about the cost of 
distribution and calling for an end to the oligopoly of GDSs, the new entrants 
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promised to offer big discounts in supplier segment fees and more flexible and 
functional distribution technology.   
One of these GNEs, G2 SwitchWorks, is a Chicago based company founded by a 
team of former Orbitz executives. Another, Cambridge, Massachusetts-based 
company, ITA Software, played a key role in the Orbitz technology platform and is 
today a leader in airfare shopping and pricing technology. Farelogix is Miami-based 
and offers an application layer (the FLX Platform) that enables distributors to 
aggregate and manage content from multiple sources, including GDSs, the Internet 
and direct connects to suppliers' reservation systems. Its CEO does not see it as an 
alternative GDS but rather as a bridging solution to enable agencies to better 
manage inventory sourcing from multiple channels. Having said this, the firm is 
offering direct connectivity to some airlines, effectively making it an alternative 
channel for suppliers to distribute to agencies (Quinby, 2006). 
Our research indicates that GNEs received considerable attention in 2005 when 
they announced an estimated pricing for suppliers at a considerable discount from 
the existing GDS fee levels of USD 2.00-2.50 per booking. Triton and G2 
SwitchWorks promised savings upwards of 75% of GDS costs, while ITA suggested 
pricing could start around 40 cents per segment for its alternative GDS offering. 
Furthermore, GNEs promised improved product and service, emphasising that 
building their systems from scratch allowed them to design flexible systems with a 
focus on customer-centric functionality.  Amongst others, GNEs offered unlimited 
capacity for new products and services, new products for airlines such as private 
fares and preferred display of inventory to authorized agencies, interoperability 
with any back-end system eliminating the integration burden, scalability through 
Service Oriented Architecture and secure direct connections to air carriers.   
However, three years ahead it is still very uncommon for a travel agency to 
operate without the use of at least one of the big four GDS systems. Despite the 
announcement of several major agencies in beta testing and important supplier 
deals from G2 Switchworks and Farelogix, GNEs accounted for well under 1% of 
the US domestic market for segments in 2006 (Quinby, 2006) . According to the 
interviews held with GDS experts, GNEs never managed to increase their market 
share and have been obliged to reposition themselves as providers of airline 
related software technology rather than GDSs. 
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6 The reasons behind GNEs' initial failure to provide an alternative to 
GDSs 
GNEs have yet to live up to their expectations, as their market penetration has 
been minimal.  Our research suggests that instead of migrating to the new GDS 
promising environment the airlines have used the GNE offer as a negotiation tool in 
their expiring contract negotiations with the GDSs. Major carriers have apparently 
won substantial concessions (30-40% discounts) and achieved many of their goals 
in these negotiations.  Why have GNEs (when they seemed to address the two 
most crucial airline concerns, superior technology and cost of distribution) failed up 
to now to win market share from GDSs? Our research revealed that there are three 
main reasons for this: 
6.1 Overestimation of technology offer 
GNEs' direct connect promise has remained unfulfilled. To date only the major 
online agency, Orbitz, has implemented airline direct connects that bypass GDSs, 
and only with a limited number of major U.S. carriers. Our research suggests that 
one big barrier to direct connect implementation are the technical challenges, 
especially in the corporate marketplace, related to meeting the rigorous and 
complex requirements for fulfilment, exception handling and back-office integration 
set by travel management companies (TMCs). Capability to meet these 
requirements, which GDSs have already invested in heavily to support, add to the 
cost and complexity of interfaces.  Another big barrier identified in our research is 
meeting the equally complex requirements set by airline alliances and airlines' 
interlining needs. GNEs' technology is of course open source and flexible but it has 
not yet been developed to cover the full functionality currently provided by GDSs.   
6.2 GDSs retaliated with updated technology and offering concessions 
Our study of the industry press revealed that GDSs did not remain impervious to 
the GNE threat.  All major GDSs introduced to a greater or lesser extent important 
changes to their pricing models substituting their originally “same price for all 
segments fees” with channel based pricing schemes, distinguishing for example 
between direct and travel agency sales, domestic and international flights or 
between leisure and corporate segments. This way they managed to offer 
concessions to airlines in the most price sensitive low cost segments whilst 
maintaining higher fees for the higher value tickets.   
 doi:10.3926/jiem.2009.v2n1.p251-272  ©© JIEM, 2009 – 2(1): 251-272 – ISSN: 2013-0953 
 
Progress in airline distribution systems: The threat of new entrants to incumbent players 264 
A. Sismanidou; M. Palacios; J. Tafur 
As the experts interviewed pointed out, GDSs also introduced innovations at the 
technology level.  First, as seen in section 4, they have all started migration 
programs to open architectures and secondly they are developing new products 
and functionality to adapt to the ever changing needs of the sector. For example, 
for smaller airlines and low cost carriers they developed the ability to connect to a 
GDS network using XML Application Programming Interfaces (APIs), which allows 
airlines to connect to the GDS with a simpler protocol, and even opt for alternative 
arrangements where an airline prices the itinerary instead of relying on third party 
fare filing requirements and the GDS' pricing engine. 
6.3 They overlooked the travel agency side of the equation 
While GNEs generated vast interest from airlines because of their proposition to 
reduce the cost of distribution, GNE penetration into the agency side of the 
equation remained scarce (see section 5).  On the other hand, GDSs offer suppliers 
worldwide distribution to thousands of travel agencies, both traditional and online. 
We can thus conclude (and our experts agree) that without guaranteed booking 
volume, lower distribution fees have no meaning to airlines. 
GDSs accounted for 59% of all flights segments booked in 2006 (PhoCusWright 
Market Research, 2007), and while this share is declining gradually, it still 
represents a substantial portion of the total marketplace. According to the same 
source, remove low-cost carriers such as Southwest, JetBlue and AirTran (all of 
which generate a far greater portion of their sales through their Web sites) from 
the segment share assessment, and the GDS segment share gets much closer to 
70%.  In other words, network carriers remain dependent upon GDSs (and their 
network of travel agencies) for a substantial majority of their sales.   
One of the reasons why travel agencies did not buy into the GNE model was that 
the level of content and functionality offered to them was inferior from the one 
supplied by GDSs (Quinby, 2006). GDSs have, over many decades and after 
serious investments, managed to develop an almost one-stop-shop content and 
sales platform for travel agencies. GDSs offer aggregated content (all major 
airlines, hotels, car rental companies and many cruise lines and tour operators), 
global offering, proven, 99.9% reliable networks, interline capabilities, guaranteed 
airline pricing, established customer service support, ancillary vendors, highest 
security for personal data, innovative products to help agencies such as group 
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capabilities and all kinds of front, mid and back-office solutions for travel agencies 
to handle the full reservation process. GNEs came onto the market with a far more 
limited product for the agencies. 
Most importantly, GDSs offer agency incentives for reaching goals. To cut down the 
cost to the airline, GNEs abolished the incentives paid to the travel agency and 
claim to replace it with better fares content from the airlines. But agencies and 
travel management companies are not encouraged if there are no attractive 
incentive schemes. 
6.4 GDSs lead to higher value customers 
Not only do GDSs give access to a wide travel agency network but, most 
importantly, GDSs seem to steer to “higher yield” customers. Indeed, JetBlue VP 
Revenue Management R. Zeni has said that tickets sold through GDSs have a  
USD30 average fare premium over those sold via its own Web site, JetBlue.com. 
This is so because a significant majority of corporate travel is booked through 
travel agencies and GDSs, including bookings generated from online corporate 
booking tools.  Currently, nearly 81% of online corporate bookings and 75% of 
offline transactions go through intermediaries, traditional and Internet travel 
management companies (PhocusWhright, 2008) who use GDSs for almost all 
transactions and who, as seen in section 6.3 above, are reluctant to migrate to a 
GNE platform. Furthermore, many large corporations are using automated tools 
that sit on top of GDS technology, to manage their employee travel needs, which 
makes the switch to a GNE even more challenging. 
Another important aspect for business travellers is the possibility to reserve 
complex itineraries on both a national and international basis. Such itineraries are 
only possible when the reservation system allows ‘interlining’ that is the ability to 
see (and reserve) in a single availability display which flights can be combined to 
reach a specific destination.  GNEs still lack this capability.   
Because of the higher margins it provides, the corporate travel segment not only 
attracts traditional carriers. Recently, more and more LCCs are making efforts to 
get business from this segment. 
In order to make their product accessible to large corporations, Low cost carriers 
(LCCs) need to have their offer fully integrated into corporate travel tools, which is 
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now only possible if they participate in the main GDSs. Full integration would for 
example allow corporate travellers to compare the LCC offer with traditional 
carriers on a single availability search (on the contrary, the lack of real-time 
comparison makes the travel purchase process more complex and cumbersome).   
LCCs want to enter the higher-yield segment available via GDSs without losing 
their customers to online agencies.  A good example of how LCCs take advantage 
of the GDS model is JetBlue, which negotiated to provide the full range of its 
discounted fares to traditional travel agencies but only through the designed 
corporate bookings tools. This gave JetBlue a way to win new business travellers 
without eroding bookings on its website.   
7 Conclusions, limitations and future research 
In this paper we have examined the latest developments and transformations in 
airline distribution, triggered mainly by the emergence and growth of the Internet 
and open architecture technologies. We have presented the key changes affecting 
the GDS industry as identified and described by airline distribution research 
analysts. In this context, a key focus and contribution point of our study has been 
the detection and description of the reasons behind GNEs’ failure to provide an 
alternative distribution channel in the marketplace. 
As seen, despite the predictions that the GDS business would disappear, GDSs still 
account for nearly 60% of all air segments booked in the US market and all major 
GDSs continue to enjoy healthy growth and margins.  Industry experts agree that 
the prospect of major carriers withdrawing from GDSs in the short term is 
becoming increasingly unlikely as GDSs cut prices and shift to a more diversified 
range of airline technology solutions, embracing a role of integrated technology 
partners. 
Our analysis suggests that the GDS success stems from a set of asset pre-emption 
mechanisms. These assets included the creation of network externalities and an 
established reputation with suppliers and distributors that allowed GDSs to raise 
significant entry barriers for new entrants who had to recreate from scratch the 
commercial network developed by the GDSs. The advantages enjoyed by GNEs 
such as access to cheaper and more efficient technology, better adaptability to the 
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new dynamic needs of the Internet era and organisational flexibility did not suffice 
to overcome their main disadvantage, that is lack of marketing capabilities. 
Lieberman and Montgomery (1988) suggest that if one firm has unique R&D 
capabilities while the other has strong marketing skills it is in the interest of the 
first firm to pioneer and the second firm to enter at a later date.  Both may earn 
significant profits entering in this sequence, but neither would gain if the order to 
entry were reversed. Applying this logic to airline reservation systems, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that new players challenging the leadership of traditional 
GDSs should as a minimum to be able to demonstrate superior marketing 
capabilities than incumbent players, at least in a niche market.  
Nevertheless, the distribution power game is by no means over yet, as market 
conditions are still very dynamic (Buhalis, 2008).   First of all, GDS deregulation 
has still not shown its full impact; deregulation is still not the case in Europe and 
the rapidly growing Asian markets, and airlines still make their content available to 
all GDSs and travel agencies.  But this could change and in the future airlines 
might not commit themselves to providing all of their content to GDSs. According 
to the experts asked, this would put additional downward pressure on GDS fees 
and GDSs would need to seek out alternative sources of value to their service to 
justify their prices. Secondly, airlines remain focused on driving business through 
their own corporate Web sites, taking an increasingly higher number of booking 
transactions away from both online travel agencies and GDSs (PhoCusWright, 
2008). Finally, as Henderson and Clark (1990) assert, if the shift to the new 
generation is radical enough, incumbents will be hampered by their existing 
capabilities. i.e. they will be unable to adapt. GDS new entrants could become 
relevant players in the travel distribution scene if they shifted their focus to 
building capabilities (technical and marketing) in new areas where traditional GDSs 
are weak: i.e. internet technology for direct airline channels or platforms with 
access to many GDSs simultaneously. This window of opportunity makes the 
experts asked believe that despite their initial failure, GNEs could be here to stay. 
Similar to most studies, this paper is subject to limitations.  The authors have 
based their analysis on the available literature on airline distribution (both 
academic and industry studies), on interviews held with a small number of airline 
and airline distribution industry experts and on the authors’ knowledge from their 
professional experience in the GDS industry. Whilst a wide variety of comments, 
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articles and reports have been published in industry publications, academic studies 
on airline distribution are relatively scarce.  Without wanting to undermine the 
quality and depth of analysis of industry sources, academic studies might be 
regarded by the readers of our paper as more relevant research material.  Thus, 
we advocate the importance of further academic research on airline distribution 
systems. Another limitation to our study has been that the number of experts 
consulted was relatively small (six) to permit us to accompany many of the 
opinions presented using a more scientific approach, such as for example a 
structured Delphi study. 
With regards to future directions, the authors feel that the analysis of future trends 
in the airline-GDS-Travel agency equation could be the subject of a broader and 
more systematic experts opinion study that could predict with more precision the 
shift in distribution power and investigate trends such as the impact of Open 
Source technologies, web social networks and mobile travel applications on the 
airlines’ distribution strategies. 
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